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Abstract: 
Transport currently accounts for around 25-30 per cent of global CO2 emissions and this 
contribution is growing rapidly. Moreover, road transport holds by far the major part in these 
emissions. Because of the social and political reluctance to increase fuel taxation, it is of some 
interest to explore the inclusion of road transport in emission trading schemes. Starting from 
the theory about tradable permits, their relevance in transport emissions, their appropriate 
targets and their potential for practical implementation are analysed. Two proposals of 
“tradable rights for fuel consumption” are presented, the one for drivers of private vehicles, 
the other for freight transportation. Finally potential pitfalls and implementation issues are 
also discussed. It is concluded that the cost of operating markets of fuel rights would be the 
price to be paid for an effective involvement of the transport sector in the effort to reduce 
emissions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Transport generated approximately 25 per cent of emissions of CO2 in the world in 2003, and 
this share amounted to 30 per cent in OECD countries. Among these emissions of one of the 
main greenhouse gases (GHG), 18 per cent come from road transport; 3 per cent from air and 
2 per cent from maritime transport (OECD 2007). Moreover, emissions from transport have 
increased sharply by 31 per cent in the world between 1990 and 2003. 
There are two factors which combine themselves to increase CO2 emissions from transport: 
the first is the dependency on the internal combustion engine with no wide-scale economically 
viable alternative available in the next decades; the second is the sharp increase in vehicle-
kilometres travelled, which seems to be an inherent feature of economic growth. This 
technological and economic dependency points out a challenging energy efficiency issue. 
One might well guess, given announcements that oil reserves will run out rapidly, whether 
one should not simply wait until reserves dry up to obtain a reduction in transport-related 
emissions. This said, rising oil prices in the long term are gradually making it more viable to 
exploit unconventional reserves, leaving aside innovations in technology which are reportedly 
opening up prospects for new fossil fuels (including fuels derived from coal, which is in 
plentiful supply world-wide). Hence, there is every reason to believe that the use of fossil 
fuels could continue on a large scale in the future.  
If the aim is to achieve ambitious GHG reduction for transport within the next few decades, 
the policies will have to be more determined: among other things, they should aim at reducing 
total consumption which means reducing vehicle kilometres travelled, not just vehicle specific 
consumption.  
Among the measures identified to reduce transport intensity, carbon taxes and vehicle taxes 
are the most cost-effective (OECD 2007; Parry et al. 2007). However, the “fuel tax protests” 
of September 2000 in several European countries show that public opinion is very resistant to 
fuel tax increases (Lyons and Chatterjee 2002). This resistance can also be explained by 
concerns about fairness, since many households depend on the car for day-to-day living and 
for getting to work. Moreover, fuel tax increases would require the international 
harmonisation of fuel taxation in different countries, which considering the European Union 
treaties appears to be extremely difficult. 
In the light of these difficulties, another instrument which combines economic incentives and 
quantity control, namely marketable or Tradable Permits (TPs), might be of interest. This 
category of instruments is part of a wider one, namely transferable permits. According to a 
general definition given by O. Godard (OECD 2001), transferable permits cover a variety of 
instruments that range from the introduction of flexibility into traditional regulation to the 
organisation of competitive markets for permits. These instruments have in common: the 
setting of quantified physical constraints in the form of obligations, permits, credits or rights 
allocated to target groups of agents consuming scarce resources; and the permission granted to 
the agents to transfer these quotas between activities, products or places (offsetting), periods 
of time (banking) or to other agents (trading, hence “tradable permits”).  
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These tradable emissions permits (or quotas1) are frequently referred to as “pollution rights”, 
implying that those who can afford to are allowed to purchase the right to harm the 
environment. However, the allocation of emission quotas does not involve the creation of 
“pollution rights”, but the restriction of these rights when previously they were unlimited. 
Making these quotas “tradable” therefore amounts to introducing flexibility and minimising 
the total cost to the community of reducing emissions.  
As shown hereafter, there are plans to include air transportation in emission trading schemes 
at least in Europe, while international maritime transportation may come soon under 
consideration. However, the major share of road transport in overall transport emissions is an 
incentive to consider also the inclusion of this transport mode in emission trading schemes. 
It is generally considered that tradable permits schemes with a large number of mobile 
sources involve huge implementation costs. It will be argued that allocation methods and 
emission caps can be defined with no excessive complexity and that administrative running 
costs can be significantly lowered with a smart design. Adding the advantages of better 
acceptability and more effective influence on behaviour given by the possibility of free 
allocation, TP schemes decentralised in the transportation sector deserve a thorough 
exploration. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, starting from the theory about tradable permits, their 
relevance in transport emissions, their appropriate targets and their potential for practical 
implementation are analysed. Second, a proposal of tradable rights for fuel consumption by 
drivers of private vehicles is presented. In the third section, a similar proposal for freight 
transportation is developed. Finally in the fourth section, potential pitfalls and implementation 
issues are discussed. 
1 FROM THEORY TO POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION IN TRANSPORT 
1.1 From theory to relevance in transport emissions 
The economic theory behind pollution permit markets can be traced back to the work of 
Coase (1960) on external costs, followed by that of Dales (1968) on regulating water use, and 
the formalisation of pollution permit markets by Montgomery (1972).  
A system of tradable permits equalises the marginal costs of reduction between all emission 
sources. Under some assumptions this is a sufficient condition for minimising the total cost of 
achieving a given emissions reduction objective (Baumol and Oates 1988). This result is 
obtained independently of the initial allocation of rights: it should be stressed that this makes 
it possible to separate the issues of efficiency and equity.  
However, Stavins (1995) has shown that when transaction costs are involved – the search for 
trading partners, negotiation, decision-making, follow-up and compliance with the rules – the 
initial allocation of rights affects the final balance and the total cost of reducing emissions. 
The authorities may therefore attempt to reduce these transaction costs, for example by 
avoiding finicky regulations or by facilitating the activity of intermediaries between vendors 
and purchasers (Hahn and Hester 1989; Foster and Hahn 1995).  
                                                 
1 The terms “quota”, “permit” or “right” will be used interchangeably in what follows. 
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Transferable permits have been used in the fisheries, and in the fields of construction rights 
and water pollution. The US “Acid Rain” scheme has been developed as a large-scale system 
of tradable sulphur dioxide emission permits (Godard 2000). Experiences in implementation 
of tradable permits markets (OECD 1997 1998) make it possible to identify some general 
criteria of success which include among others: the simplicity and the clearness of the system; 
the possibility of effective market operation; the credibility of emissions monitoring and 
sanctions; and the long term validity of permits.  
With regard to the quantitative reduction objective, the essential difference between taxes and 
permits lies in the fact that in practice the public authorities do not possess full information on 
the reduction costs for the different agents. With a permit-based approach, achieving the 
quantitative objective of emissions reduction is guaranteed, but there is no guarantee with 
regard to the actual level of the marginal costs of reduction. On the contrary, in the case of the 
tax, the marginal cost of reduction for each agent is fixed, but there is no guarantee with 
regard to the amount of emissions reduction.  
This uncertainty makes it difficult for the regulator to make a choice as errors regarding 
reduction costs for agents, particularly with regard to the distribution of efforts over time and 
between agents, may be very costly to the community. Nevertheless, a number of criteria may 
be of use when making this choice (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
A first criterion for the appropriateness of a quantity-based approach (i.e. emission quotas) is 
whether the damage to the environment is increasing very rapidly or becoming irreversible 
when certain emission thresholds are reached or exceeded. In this case, tradable permits 
provide a relative advantage over a tax approach since quotas control reduces the cost of 
errors (Weitzman 1974).  
There is a controversy regarding the pace of damage cost function of greenhouse gas 
emissions, between those who argue it is rather steep relative to the abatement cost function 
(e.g. Stern 2006), and those who argue the opposite (see for instance Nordhaus 2006). In order 
to overcome this uncertainty about the costs of (in)action, a hybrid approach combining 
permits and a “safety valve” for price (see below) would provide a pragmatic solution. 
Nevertheless, the choice between taxation and permits requires a case-by-case analysis. A 
general solution to this problem of uncertainty with regard to the costs of emissions 
reductions has been proposed by Baumol and Oates (1988, pages 74-76), on the basis of an 
idea developed by Roberts and Spence (1976). It involves setting a payment in full discharge 
(i.e. a “safety valve”): this way, the emitter could be discharged of his/her obligation to return 
permits by paying the payment in full discharge for each unit of emission exceeding the rights 
he/she holds. This payment in full discharge would then set the upper bound of the permit 
price. This hybrid solution is to be applied when the regulator must make decisions either 
with regard to the temporal distribution of efforts (for example annual objectives) or with 
regard to the distribution of this effort between the different actors or sectors. 
A second criterion is whether agents are more sensitive to quantitative signals than price 
signals, particularly if the price-elasticity of demand is low in the short or medium term as is 
the case in transportation. Here again a permit system is more appropriate.  
For example, emissions from travel may be reduced by various means: changing driving style, 
reducing vehicle-kilometres of travel (by increasing the number of passengers in vehicles, 
reorganising trips or changing the locations of activities); by changing one’s vehicle or 
changing mode in favour of one which consumes less energy. Some of these actions may be 
implemented in the short term, while others such as changing one’s vehicle, changing one’s 
place of work or residence, may take much longer. The result of this is elasticities which are 
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generally low in the short term and considerably higher in the long term. For example, for fuel 
consumption, the price-elasticity values are between –0.2 or –0.3 in the short term2 and –0.6 
or –0.8 in the long term (Goodwin 1988; Graham and Glaister 2000; Brons et al 2006). 
Furthermore, a third criterion that is an important factor for the effectiveness of TPs is the 
heterogeneity of the agents involved in the system. This means that the marginal costs of 
abatement must be sufficiently different between agents in order to allow benefits from 
trading permits, thereby making the market function effectively. 
For instance, if one considers the use of private car, the marginal abatement cost curves are 
highly varied and, in particular, rise as one moves from urban to suburban and then to rural 
settings. On two essential points, namely changes in the locations of activities and changes in 
transport mode, the possibilities for action differ very greatly in both nature and degree on the 
basis of the residential locations of the individuals (urban, suburban, rural). Changes in the 
locations of activities in order to reduce the distances between different activities are much 
easier to make in urban areas than in suburban or rural locations, as a result of the density of 
available activities: changes are possible in the short term for activities where the location 
imposes little constraints, such as shopping or leisure; reducing distances between home and 
work is easier in a conurbation which provides a high density of job and housing 
opportunities. Likewise, public transport which provides an alternative to the private car is 
more frequently available in urban areas. 
Finally, last but not least, in political terms, systems where permits are allocated free of 
charge may be seen as a means of avoiding an additional tax, and this can enhance the 
acceptability of the new instrument. With this free allocation, economic agents have a 
supplementary incentive to save whether emissions, trips or distance travelled, beyond their 
initial allocation of permits, because they can sell unused permits and receive a tangible 
reward for their “virtuous” behaviour. 
The main arguments against the use of permits in the transport system are the cost of 
administration and monitoring over a large number of mobile sources and the transaction 
costs of quotas transfer. However this issue happened to be similar in the case of road pricing 
and is now better addressed and effectively implemented, thanks to electronic technology 
which is affordable today.  
1.2 Which targets for reducing transport emissions? 
Emissions from transportation stems essentially from the technical characteristics of vehicles 
(energy source and vehicle specific consumption) and the intensity of travel (distances 
travelled) as a function of economic and social trends. Moreover, this intensity of travel 
results from the supply of transport infrastructure and services (price and quality of service for 
different transport modes) and land use through location of activities.  
There is potential for controlling nuisances arising from transport in several but not all of 
these areas: transport supply, vehicle specific emissions, fuel standards, car ownership, car 
use (vehicle-kilometres travelled), land use and end-user fuel consumption (for a detailed 
review of these actual or potential implementations, see Raux 2004). 
Regarding the supply of transport infrastructure and services, local and central governments 
which plan land use and define transport policy, and hence provide transport infrastructure 
and services, could be involved in emission trading schemes. However, the basic difficulty is 
                                                 
2 i.e. a 10 per cent increase in price would lead to a 3 per cent reduction in fuel demand. 
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to monitor mobile sources which can be fuelled at a number of locations in a specific 
administrative area and can travel through other administrative areas (Salon and Sperling 
2008). 
Obviously the road vehicle industry, which influences specific emissions of new cars and 
trucks, should take its share of the burden. However, apart from problems of coordination 
with other upstream or downstream approaches (see discussion below), there is poor relation 
with actual emissions, because of the driving pattern of the car user. Car ownership is another 
indirect way of controlling car travel but the linkage with actual fuel consumption is also very 
crude. 
The amount of distance travelled is one of the main drivers of greenhouse gases emissions, 
given the current transport technologies. Controlling land use is in principle an attractive way 
of reducing these distances, but its effects are controversial: it has still not been proven that it 
is possible to reverse the tendency to travel longer distances by compacting locations. 
However, one must recognise that the spatial concentration of activities yields more 
opportunities for cost-efficient transport alternatives such as mass transit, which is less energy 
consuming per passenger-km. 
Targeting the fossil fuel consumption of end users with tradable permits is the most 
decentralised incentive for reducing CO2 emissions. End-users are an important target for 
emissions reduction since vehicle use represents about 75 to 80% (tank to wheel) of whole 
emissions from the point of view of vehicle life-cycle analysis (from cradle to grave). End-
users as the final decision-makers can modify, albeit with more or less constraints, their travel 
choices, activity locations, or choice of vehicle or transport mode.  
1.3 CO2 tax, upstream or downstream permits? 
The fiscal instrument is widely used in the transport sector, essentially because of its tax 
yield. Fuel excise duties levied in the European Union in 2002 varied widely in Member 
States, from €0.296 to €0.742 per litre for premium grade petrol and from €0.242 to €0.742 
per litre for diesel oil (CEC 2002). Although the current level of taxation might be considered 
high, it is not high enough to further reduce fuel consumption by transport.  
The “tax rebellion” that took place in several European countries during the high rise of oil 
price in September 2000 shows how sensitive public opinion is to fuel taxation. Central 
government is a focus for opposition as it benefits from the tax, although it has little control 
over oil prices. Proposing a “CO2 tax” in view of emissions reduction is likely to start again 
the debates on the use of the fiscal revenues from the excises, which currently in the majority 
of the European countries are not earmarked and play an essential part in the balance of public 
finances. 
If one considers the development of stringent objectives of emissions reduction in the future, a 
fuel rationing seems unavoidable: this rationing can basically take the form of either price 
rationing (tax) or quantities rationing (permits). From this point of view the acceptance of 
rationing is an identical precondition for the two instruments and needs at least an information 
campaign and a political willpower in order to introduce any measure of emission control. 
This is the first step which needs to be achieved. It is in this context of “accepted rationing” 
that the relative acceptability of permits can be evaluated. 
Although for the economist the marginal effects of tax or permits on microeconomic decisions 
about fuel demand are equivalent, the political perception of the instrument can have some 
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importance. There would be thus some interest to elaborate mechanisms which explicitly 
separate the objective of fiscal revenues from the objective of reduction of CO2 emissions. 
In order to reduce the administrative costs, it seems relevant to set up the system of permits at 
the very upstream, on a level where the actors are very few: it could be the fuel refiners or 
distributors, which already transmit the current excise duty to the ultimate consumer and 
return the product of the excises to the central government. By imposing to the producers and 
the importers of oil, natural gas and coal to return the quotas, the system would cover the 
whole CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of the hydrocarbon fuels by the end-
users (Winkelman et al 2000). 
However, this advantage of complete coverage by an upstream permit system has lost its 
strength today in Europe, with the operation of the CO2 Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) 
between energy intensive fixed industrial facilities since 2005. An upstream permit system 
should now be modulated as a complement to the ETS. 
Moreover an upstream system is prone to two disadvantages. 
Firstly, there is a risk of diluting the incentive effect of permits on the final emitter, so that 
they implement the complete panoply of behavioural adaptations which are available to them. 
Indeed, whether the permits are acquired by auction or distributed free to the fuel suppliers, 
these suppliers would pass opportunity costs3 relating to these permits to their customers as a 
simple additional fee. In this case, the advantage vis-à-vis the current system of fuel taxation 
is null. 
The second disadvantage appears in the event of free allocation of quotas to the fuel suppliers. 
If the permits are allocated free what would be the use of revenue generated by this initial 
distribution? The fuel suppliers could transmit the opportunity costs relating to these permits 
which they would have received free: that would not call into question the economic 
efficiency of the system but certainly its acceptability, since those supporting the effort of 
reduction would not benefit from the revenue created by the free allocation. An upstream 
permits system thus seems, for reasons of political acceptability, incompatible with a free 
allocation4. 
Lastly, the European Commission has said it wishes to include transport in the ETS gradually, 
starting with air transport. Given the slow progress of negotiations regarding international air 
transport emissions at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the European 
Commission issued a communication in September 2005 and then a Directive in December 
2006 (CEC 2006), proposing to bring aircraft operators into the EU ETS for all flights 
arriving or departing from the European Union. After numerous and lengthy discussions with 
the Member States and the European Parliament, a deal has been set in June 2008, which still 
needs to be approved. According to this deal, the scheme will concern all the flights beginning 
in 2012 (despite the opposition of the United States till now), and the method of allocating 
allowances will be harmonised across the EU, especially the benchmark for calculating 
allowance allocations, i.e. the ratio of total quantity allowances to the tonnes-kilometres 
achieved by the operators. The total quantity of allowances would be calculated on the basis 
of average CO2 emissions for the aviation sector over the period 2004-2006 (97 per cent of 
this quantity) and set to decrease gradually after the starting of the scheme. A fixed 
                                                 
3 As the permits will have a value on the market, the opportunity cost for a fuel supplier would consist in not 
selling on the market the permits received for free, or not recovering their value in the form of extra costs to their 
consumers. 
4 Unless this revenue is taxed, from which arises a new complexity. 
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percentage of this total would be allocated free of cost (85 per cent in 2012) and the remainder 
would be auctioned. Each aircraft operator could then apply for a free allowance based on its 
historical activity (tonne-kilometres). In addition, operators would be able to buy allowances 
from other sectors covered by the ETS. 
In a study on the design of a GHG emissions trading system for the United States, Nordhaus 
and Danish (2003) ruled out a downstream system from the outset, judging that it would be 
too difficult to administer millions of sources. Like Winkelman et al. (2000), they argue the 
case for a hybrid approach which would combine an upstream procedure for fuel producers 
with a downstream procedure for automobile manufacturers. However, as German (2006) 
points out, an analysis of the detailed implementation of a hybrid scheme such as this shows 
that there are a number of difficulties: one of the main problems is the risk of double counting 
both in terms of credits to automobile manufacturers for fuel efficiency improvements and in 
terms of allowances for fuel producers. This risk of double counting arises mainly from the 
timing of calculations of allocations and credits: allocations for vehicle manufacturers are 
based on the entire lifetime of the vehicle, while those for fuel producers are for emissions in 
the current year. Generally, the incorporation of vehicle manufacturers in an upstream permit 
scheme would mean subtracting manufacturer efficiency allocations from annual allocations 
to fuel producers each year, which would require accurate monitoring of vehicle kilometres 
actually travelled, driving conditions that influence actual consumption and vehicle scrapping. 
Furthermore, this type of programme does not cover the existing vehicle fleet, which is 
known to have a lifespan of around 15-20 years on average. In short, such a programme 
would be highly complex. 
This is why it is of some interest to explore the possibilities of a fully downstream 
decentralisation of permit markets within the transportation sector. The analysis is performed 
separately for private vehicles and for the freight industry, due to significant differences in 
economic behaviour between them.  
2 TRADABLE FUEL RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE VEHICLES 
Here is described a proposal of “tradable fuel consumption rights” for motorists (based with 
some alterations on Raux and Marlot 2005). This idea has some connections with the more 
general one of “domestic tradable quotas”5 which would encompass all fossil fuel 
consumption of households, thus including e.g. home heating. However, application of quotas 
to every category of household energy consumption needs careful investigation and 
assessment of each one, and this is done here for private transport.  
In the case of France, private cars account for approximately three-fifth of automotive fuel 
sales (gasoline and diesel oil), the rest being consumed by light and heavy goods vehicles. 
The issues of obligation liability, allocation of rights, exchange mechanism, monitoring, 
implementation (phasing in) and equity are tackled successively. 
                                                 
5 This idea was firstly developed by David Fleming (http://www.dtqs.org/ Accessed in December 2008). 
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2.1 Obligation liability 
Motorists as consumers of fuel and hence emitters of CO2 would be liable for the obligation to 
return the fuel rights to the regulating authority. 
A consumer who purchases motor vehicle fuel (which will necessarily be burnt) would have 
to transfer the corresponding rights to the regulating authority. These rights would then be 
cancelled. The right corresponds to an authorisation to emit the CO2 equivalent of a litre of 
fuel6. These rights may be held initially by the agent or purchased in the permit market. 
2.2 Allocation of rights 
Different options are available for allocation of fuel rights and these refer to different views of 
equity. One option could be to allocate free fuel rights on a per capita basis. For instance, in 
the case of France, and starting in year 1, the rights allocation would be of the order of 27 
billion litres of diesel or petrol used by private cars in France for 2005, or per capita – child or 
adult living in France– rights amounting to 450 litres per year. Based on an average vehicle 
consumption of 8 litres per 100 km, that would work out at 5,600 km of travel solo driving 
per year, but 22,400 km for a family of four. Car-pooling would therefore leave families some 
room for manoeuvre depending on their size. The rate by which rights allocations would be 
reduced each year would be announced several decades ahead and periodically adjusted by a 
regulatory authority independent of the government in office. 
The rights would remain valid for an unlimited period, which may lead to hoarding and 
speculation. However, the CO2 -equivalent value of quotas held by an agent could be reduced 
in the following year in accordance with the rate of the reduction in free rights allocations 
decided by the regulating authority. 
2.3 Exchange mechanism 
In order to consume more fuel than his/her free allocation, a consumer would have to 
purchase additional rights on the market. On the other hand, a consumer who does not use all 
his/her allocated rights could sell them. This possibility of selling unused rights provides an 
additional incentive for modifying one’s behaviour, particularly for persons who can do so at 
low cost. 
However, given the huge number of potential participants, the exchange would not be 
bilateral, but rather centralised through a stock exchange which would yield the daily value of 
fuel right. Practically, participants would buy and sell rights through intermediates like their 
usual bank operator or buy them at the petrol pump (see below). This means perfect 
information for participants about the current price of the fuel right. Since transactions would 
be fully authorised on the market, this would minimise the risk of a black market.  
For acceptability reasons the management of fuel rights would not be left entirely to the 
market: rights would be sold at a price fixed by the authority and at which the authority would 
                                                 
6 Currently in France, 2.4 kg CO2 for a litre of gasoline and 2.6 kg CO2 for a litre of diesel. Strictly speaking, 
this value should vary according to the type of fuel: diesel fuel contains more carbon than gasoline, gasoline with 
ETBE can have different emissions than gasoline without ETBE. A conversion factor would apply for each kind 
of fuel. For the purpose of simplicity of exposition and evaluation in this paper we have assumed that one right 
unit corresponds to one litre of any fuel. 
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buy back unused rights. This implies that the authority would adjust this price on a yearly 
basis. 
2.4 Monitoring, verification and penalties 
The sale and purchase of rights would be supervised at a national level by a regulatory 
authority. In order to reduce administrative costs and enforce a reliable monitoring, fuel rights 
transactions will have to be validated as close as possible to the time of fuel purchase, that is 
to say when the motorist buys fuel at the pump. The rights, awarded annually, would be held 
on a chipcard which records rights debit and credit operations. This could be either a smart 
card compatible with the automatic teller machines (ATM) that are already installed at petrol 
stations or a modification of credit smartcards currently used in these ATM. Rights could 
therefore be debited (or purchased at the current rate) when buying fuel. It would also be 
possible to purchase or resell permits in banks, using ATM bank distributors or over the 
Internet. 
2.5 A combined taxation and marketable rights system 
It would be socially unacceptable to apply suddenly the fuel rights system to all motorists. So 
the implementation of the fuel rights market should be progressive and would coexist with a 
CO2 taxation system. Moreover, taking part in the fuel rights system should be voluntary. 
Lastly, since rights transactions would be monitored when buying fuel at the pump the 
administrative barrier between the two systems of taxation and fuel rights cannot be 
impenetrable. 
A solution is to set up the “safety valve” referred to in section 1 above (in fact a “CO2 tax”), 
which would be paid both by fuel consumers who wish to stay outside the rights market, and 
those who are taking part in it but have used up their allocation and are either unable or 
unwilling to purchase permits. This tax would therefore constitute a price ceiling of permits 
on the market and would have to be adjusted with reference to the country’s international 
commitments to reduce emissions.  
If the rights are allocated on a per capita basis, people not willing to cope with this system 
could immediately sell their rights. However if they buy fuel they would be liable to pay the 
“CO2 tax”. 
To sum up, the current fuel excise taxation system will be supplemented by the coexistence of 
two schemes: the rights market on a voluntary basis on the one hand, the extension of fuel 
taxation with a “CO2 tax” for those not wishing to take part in the rights market on the other 
hand. These two systems will be the alternative proposed to motorists: the incentive to adopt 
the fuel rights system will be effective if the price of fuel right stays lower than the CO2 tax.  
2.6 Equity issues 
An assessment of such a system of marketable fuel rights has been performed in the case of 
France. In this application (see Raux and Marlot 2005) rights were supposed to be allocated to 
car owners.  
Two main points can be stressed from this assessment. First, the comparison between taxation 
and permits involves the fiscal gain in the case of the tax (to the detriment of the motorists as 
a group) and the fiscal loss for the central government in the case of fuel rights because of the 
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free allocation. Second, in the case of fuel rights, residential location plays a fundamental 
role: the main winners are households living in the city centre or the suburbs who, on average, 
sell rights (they can save fuel therefore save rights more easily by reducing their vehicle-
kilometres travelled) while the households living in periurban areas are on average the largest 
purchasers. 
The free allocation on an equal per capita basis penalises high income households more than 
others: data from 1997 (Hivert 1999) show that the average mileage per vehicle owned 
increases fairly steadily with income, from slightly more than 12,000 km for the lowest 
income brackets (less than 11.4 thousand euros per year) to almost 16,000 km for the highest 
income brackets (more than 61 thousand euros per year). 
Lastly, the initial free allocation avoids imposing an excessive burden on consumers, 
particularly the least well off. The average annual consumption of cars varies from slightly 
more than 900 litres (for the lowest incomes) to 1300 or 1400 litres (for the highest incomes), 
while the proportion of mileage that is covered on home-to-work trips varies between 24% 
(for the lowest incomes) and 30 or even 39% for the highest income groups. These figures 
show that “necessary” travel would generally not be affected, at least in the first years of the 
scheme with a high level of free allocation. However, this average data should not conceal a 
possible existence of situations of fragility, for example the “rural poor” who have no 
alternative but the car: such situations would require ad hoc compensation. 
While a fuel rights scheme would increase the acceptance of a policy aiming at reduction of 
fuel use, when compared with an additional tax, the equity issue remains of paramount 
importance. The design of free permits allocation obviously governs the scheme acceptability. 
2.7 Concluding comments 
This system has the advantage of simplicity, as the unit of exchange is the right for each litre 
of fuel that is consumed. The amounts consumed or exchanged are monitored when fuel is 
purchased, and all persons who purchase fuel for a private use can participate in the market: 
monitoring is therefore straightforward as it only involves fuel purchases. The possibility of 
freely exchanging permits will discourage any tendency for a black market to develop.  
The free allocation of emission rights creates a rent which is distributed between the 
individuals (if rights are allocated free on an equal per capita basis). In addition, the 
consumers of fuel are strongly encouraged to reduce their consumption as they can make a 
real and tangible profit from selling their unused permits. 
The cost of implementation of the administrative system is estimated at the most between 3 
and 4 euros per individual chipcard, if created from scratch (by analogy with the current 
implementation of national health chipcard “Vitale” in France). However, one can feel that 
big fuel retailing companies will develop quickly such a system in the framework of their 
ongoing loyalty schemes in order to attract customers, with a reasonable expectation of very 
moderate additional costs. 
Overall this scheme is designed in a way that allows a domestic implementation, that is to say 
a State regulating private cars fuel consumption in order to comply with its own commitments 
regarding CO2 emissions7. In this scheme foreign drivers would not benefit from the fuel 
                                                 
7 In order to attribute national responsibilities UNFCCC greenhouse gases inventories per country are based 
upon fuel sales within the country, excluding fuels used in ships or aircrafts for international transport. 
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rights free allocation of the country they visit and would have to buy rights or more probably 
pay the “CO2 tax” on automotive fuel.  
However, a domestic implementation raises the issue of coordination with neighbouring 
countries, because of the potential of cross border fuelling (i.e. “tank tourism” by a driver 
residing in one country and travelling to another one in order to fuel the vehicle): the driver 
behaviour results from a trade-off of the price difference between the two countries and the 
distance travelled (Rietveld et al 2001; Banfi et al 2005). In case of no coordination between 
neighbouring countries, an obvious limit would be put on a government trying to control more 
strongly fuel consumption. Yet it should be underlined that this problem is not specific to 
quotas approach but also concerns the tax approach. 
3 TRADABLE FUEL RIGHTS FOR FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION 
As previously explained, environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency pleads to 
target directly the consumption of fossil fuels: other targets such as tonne-kilometres, vehicle-
kilometres, load rate or empty journeys would require expensive information for the regulator 
and would be source of efficiency loss. 
Here again the design of CO2 emissions rights for freight transportation implies identification 
of agents holding these quotas and elaboration of an allocation method. Then issues of 
geographic and sector-based coverage of the scheme are discussed, followed by monitoring 
and transaction costs issues. Based on this discussion a final proposal is presented, followed 
by concluding remarks on potential environmental and border effects. 
3.1 Rights holders, obligations and allocation 
Which entities will hold, exchange and have to return the rights for the generated emissions? 
And, consequently, which agents will have to bear the emissions reduction burden? These 
questions are due to the fact that freight transport activity, and its consequences regarding 
CO2 emissions, are the output of a whole set of decisions taken by agents, i.e. shippers and 
carriers, with sometimes divergent economic logic and unequal capacities of negotiation. 
The targeting of fuel consumption naturally results in putting the incentives on the carriers. 
However, current operation of the logistic chain leaves them only limited margin for 
manoeuvre. Shippers, because of their requirements in terms of delivery schedules, logistic 
constraints and required services, impose a framework with which the carriers must comply. 
Is it possible to involve the agents upstream of the logistic chain, in order to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the incentives? 
For a firm carrying goods on its own the problem does not seem insurmountable, given the 
integration of decisions within the firm. The firm will optimise its activity, including its 
industrial and geographical structure of production and distribution. For for-hire carriers, the 
question is a little more complex given the current situation of vassalage of the carrier vis-à-
vis the shipper. It would be appreciable to work out a system which makes it possible to share 
out efforts of reduction between shippers and carriers, taking into account their respective 
margin for manoeuvre.  
One way to involve the shippers in the responsibility of fuel consumption is to devise a 
relevant mechanism of fuel rights allocation to them. Two main types of initial allocation, 
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namely auction or free allocation can be proposed. The first has the advantage of avoiding 
complex computations, which require sometimes expensive information to obtain. It also 
avoids involving the authorities in a difficult negotiation with the agents, by letting the market 
arbitrate.  
The auction of permits offers other advantages, vis-à-vis the method of free allocation mostly 
used, that of “grandfather rights”. This last method which allocates rights in proportion of the 
past activity, gives a premium to “bad pupils”: those who use old and polluting technologies 
would get, other things being equal, more quotas than others. Moreover, this method of free 
allocation encourages the entities to delay their actions of pollution reduction, since they can 
anticipate the implementation of such a system, whose preparation takes several years in 
general: for instance in anticipation carriers could use “dirty” trucks in order to get a higher 
allocation. Lastly, the auctioning of the initial allocation also makes it possible to treat new 
entities entering the sector on an equal basis with the existing firms. 
However, this auctioning is to be perceived as an additional tax, which would undermine its 
acceptability. This is why the possibility of a free allocation is explored. Several free 
allocation methods were tested by in-depth interviews with a sample of carriers and shippers 
(N=20). These methods included “benchmarking” allocation either to the carriers or to the 
shippers (with reference to the average ratio of total CO2 emissions per tonne-kilometre of the 
freight transport sector), and a “grand-fathering” allocation to the shipper, based on their past 
individual ratio of CO2 emissions per tonne-kilometre. 
Many objections were raised by the interviewees. The feedback, from the carriers toward the 
shipper, of the information on consumption and vehicle-kilometres seems particularly 
difficult: the audits considered would be thus particularly expensive (even if they remain 
limited to the firms which would voluntarily adhere to the system). The standard of allocation 
according to an average ratio of fuel quota per tonne-kilometre, even individualised by firm, 
appeared non-relevant and was disputed. The reporting character of this information and the 
fact of creating rent by this mechanism of free allocation, would make possible some 
fraudulent behaviour by collusion between carriers and shippers: even if they remained a 
minority, that would undermine the credibility of the mechanism.  
As a whole, these drawbacks and the complexity of this mechanism of allocation justified the 
reserve of the majority of the shippers and even the opposition of some of them. 
So it seems relevant to avoid free allocation to shippers. However, some free allocation could 
be considered for transport operators, at least in the first years of the scheme, in order to 
improve its acceptability. For road hauliers this free allocation could be a “lump sum” 
allocation per vehicle in order to avoid complicated computations. For rail and river operators, 
which are far less numerous, this could be a grand-fathering allocation as it is planned for air 
carriers in the current project of the European Commission (see above). 
3.2 Sector-based and geographic coverage  
The effective implementation of such a market for the freight transportation sector should be 
made on the level of the European Union at least, for obvious reasons of harmonisation of 
competition between the transport operators of the various Member States. That would imply 
in particular that the principle of a free allocation or not and, if a free allocation is adopted, 
the choice of the method of allocation and the computation of the allocations are decided at 
the level of the Union.  
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The environmental effectiveness implies to cover all freight transport modes, namely road, 
rail, river, maritime and air transport modes. In Europe currently in rail transport fuel taxes 
are much lower than for road, inland and maritime shipping as well as air transport are not 
submitted to any fuel taxation. These differences should obviously be taken into account 
when considering distribution of free permits. 
This effectiveness also implies to cover the other transport sectors, and in particular the 
private cars, whether by a fuel rights market (see above) or by a CO2 fuel tax (for the sectors 
or agents not included in the fuel rights market). 
It would be socially unacceptable to go suddenly from a system of taxation to a complete fuel 
rights system. The two systems must thus coexist, while creating a financial incentive to 
adhere to the permits system. 
As for personal transport, a “CO2 tax” would apply to the freight transport operators not 
wishing to take part in the fuel rights market. It would also apply as a “full discharge” 
payment to the participants to the rights market who exhausted their initial allocation and 
could not, or would not, buy rights on the market. The entrance into the fuel rights market 
would be thus on a voluntary basis.  
The geographic coverage on the level of the European Union would make it possible to cover 
all the intra-European international freight transport, including by air, river and sea. However, 
international air and maritime transport is not yet covered by the Kyoto protocol. Regarding 
intra-European international air transport, the European Commission proposes its integration 
in the existing ETS (see above). 
3.3 Monitoring and transaction costs  
The system effectiveness relies on the possibilities of checking the emissions and managing 
the fuel rights market, without the transaction costs becoming prohibitive.  
As seen above free allocation methods for shippers imply important costs of information 
retrieval and risks of fraudulent deviance of the system, which justified their dismissal. The 
suppression of a free allocation option removes these costs of information and controlling 
fraud. 
Regarding the transactions, the transfers of quotas between shippers and carriers would be 
part of their contractual relationship, as currently with the fulfilment of the transport services. 
These contractual relations are already the subject of legal and regulatory provisions, without 
need for intrusion of the authorities into the commercial relationship: there will be thus no 
extra administrative cost from this point of view. In the same way, the exchanges of permits 
on the market would not be bilateral but would pass through a stock market: thus there would 
be no search cost for a partner for the exchange. 
The monitoring would thus be reduced to the transfer of quotas to the regulating authority at 
the time of fuel purchase. The purchases of fuel for trucks are done either at the pump or out 
of a tank on the carrier’s site. For the purchases from the pump, and particularly with the 
pumps reserved for the heavy trucks, the driver generally uses a magnetic or chip card. These 
cards and the ATM distributors should have their software modified in order to manage the 
debit of rights in proportion to the fuel bought. The participation of the carrier firm to the fuel 
rights market would suppose an exclusive use of chip cards when fuelling at the pump. In 
relation to supplies at the tank, the invoice of the fuel supplier should include the debit of 
rights to the carrier firm (or invoicing them if the firm does not take part in the fuel rights 
market). On the whole, the risks of fraud are particularly reduced. 
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3.4 Final proposal 
The tradable fuel rights would be thus based on quotas of CO2 calculated from the carbon 
contained in the fuel (mainly diesel oil for trucks) consumed by any freight vehicle user, i.e. a 
for-hire carrier or a shipper performing its own transport. Obligation would be made to the 
user to return to the regulating authority the corresponding rights, which would then be 
cancelled. 
In principle there should be no free allocation to shippers. However, in case of full integration 
in the ETS shippers holding ETS quotas could use them for transport.  
A free allocation could be devised for transport operators in order to improve the acceptability 
of the scheme. Given the European scale, the principle of a free allocation or not and, if a free 
allocation is adopted, the choice of the method of allocation and the calculation of the 
allocations would be decided on the level of the European Union. 
The for-hire carrier (or the transport organiser) would negotiate with the shipper in order to 
get (or be paid for) fuel rights in view of the achievement of transport operation. Carriers 
holding unused rights (after having transferred the required quantity referred to above to the 
regulating authority) could then sell them to the fuel rights market. 
All freight transport modes would be covered, i.e. road, rail, river, maritime and air modes. 
The geographical coverage would be on the level of the European Union at least. 
Monitoring of quotas to be transferred to the regulating authority would occur at the time of 
fuel purchase, either at the pump or when filling a tank on the carrier’s site.  
The entrance into the fuel rights market would be on a voluntary basis. A “CO2 tax” would 
apply to the fuel consumers not wishing to take part in the fuel rights market. Participants to 
the rights market who have exhausted their initial allocation could buy additional rights on the 
market or pay the CO2 tax as a “full discharge” payment. Other transport sectors or agents not 
included in the fuel rights market (eventually the private cars, depending on the extension of 
fuel rights market to them, see above) would be covered at least by a CO2 tax. 
3.5 Potential environmental and border effects 
Regarding the possibility of controlling the growth of road freight transport and hence its CO2 
emissions, several counteracting forces are at work, to mention the main ones: for some 
goods, their value is so high that the variations of transport costs under consideration will 
have hardly any influence on the distribution practices; the logic of financial optimisation of 
inventory (“holding costs”) tends to “zero stock” and “just-in-time” deliveries: this logic 
mainly outclasses the transport-environment optimisation logic; moreover, the growing 
specialisation of the production lines in the factories results in multiplying the exchanges 
between the production sites and thus the kilometres travelled by intermediate goods. 
These insights show that different sectors of the economy would have differing responses to a 
CO2 tax and an emission trading system. However at the macro level observation shows that 
the sensitivity of behaviours to the fuel price is not null, given the recent developments in oil 
price. For instance the total fuel deliveries in France, after a first decline in 2000, are falling 
since 2002 (SESP 2006) and this evolution is well correlated with that of the fuel price. This 
sensitivity affects the private cars in addition to the heavy goods vehicles: the total diesel oil 
consumption for the latter has not grown since 1999. 
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The sector-based and geographic coverage and the mechanism considered make it possible to 
claim that there would be no discrimination with regards to the market of fuel rights between 
the firms of the 27 Member States of the European Union, whether they are shippers or 
carriers. 
A legitimate interrogation remains, that of the possible competition of carriers external to the 
European Union. In fact, the carriage of goods is less prone to economic distortions than the 
other branches of industry: freight will always have to be loaded in locations within the EU in 
order to be distributed for use in other locations within the EU, whether processing industries 
or final goods delivery locations. The only notable incidence would come from carriers being 
able to load fuel outside the European Union, thus not subjected to CO2 taxation or fuel rights, 
and then carry out a transport within the EU. This competition could be significant in the 
border countries, since trucks can have a cruising range of 1,500 to 3,000 kilometres on a 
single tank (CEC 2002). This issue would require some kind of coordination with 
neighbouring countries. 
3.6 Concluding comments 
Shippers using own-account transport have a direct incentive to minimise their fuel 
consumption, since they would have to return rights in direct proportion to the fuel consumed 
by their vehicles. Conversely, shippers using for-hire carriage are not directly subject to this 
restriction. This said, there are two factors that could influence the behaviour of these 
shippers. Firstly, should they fail to make allowances for this constraint on carriers, there is 
the risk the latter may gradually disappear, which would mean that the economic balance 
would tip towards transport operators who managed to survive: this alone might persuade 
reluctant shippers to compromise. The second factor is the increasing trend towards the 
inclusion of environmental aspects into corporate activity reports to shareholders and the 
public. This would give shippers an incentive to gear their activity to reducing shipment-
related emissions.  
For their part, hauliers and organisers of third-party transport could save the rights they 
negotiate on different orders from shippers. If they have made efforts to minimise their own 
fuel consumption, for example by grouping loads and reducing vehicle-kilometres or specific 
vehicle consumption, they would pocket the difference. In the same way, regarding railroad 
combined transport, the fuel consumption for the road transport haul to a rail terminal would 
be debited to combined transport organisers when they provide the transport service (as well 
as any diesel consumed on a rail transport leg). Lastly, rail transport operators would receive 
rights allocations, most of which they could sell on depending on the degree of electrification 
of the network (and the share of nuclear or non-fossil energy used to generate their electrical 
power).  
Regarding the articulation with world international freight transport by air and sea 
(international bunkers not currently covered by the Kyoto Protocol), the inclusion of air 
transport in the European ETS is already on tracks, as seen above. When it comes to maritime 
transport, the same approach might be adopted by the European Commission as stated in the 
“climate package” adopted in December 2008. If no agreement is reached with the 
International Maritime Organisation by 2011, the Commission should make a proposal to 
include international maritime emissions with the aim of its entry into force by 2013. These 
initiatives are first steps towards the inclusion of international transport in a worldwide 
emission trading scheme. 
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4 POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Europe’s experience with the ETS helps to identify the pitfalls to be avoided: this section 
shows how the above proposals can respond to these concerns. Second, the issue of the co-
ordinated launch of these different markets is discussed. 
4.1 Pitfalls to avoid in the light of the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
The experience gained from the first phase of the European ETS (2005-2007) has been 
instructive in many respects: much criticism has been levelled at the ETS in particular (cf. 
Open Europe 2007) and at emissions trading markets in general with respect to their ability to 
meet the challenge of curbing greenhouse gas emissions.  
A first criticism often encountered is that this “market” never actually worked in the first 
place, as can be seen from the collapse in the permit price of CO2 per tonne in 2006. This 
happened from the point when Member States first began to declare their actual emissions, 
which turned out to be lower than the initial allocations. Furthermore, when it became clear 
that the allowances held in this first phase would not be valid for the second phase (2008-
2012) the market price plummeted again. It can be argued that all of this shows that the 
market played its equilibrium price setting role perfectly given the surfeit of, by then, 
worthless allowances. 
The over-generous allocation of allowances which precipitated the collapse of the market 
price can be put down to Member States, since most of them clearly sought to favour their 
own industries: the latter captured the decision-making process after intensive lobbying 
(Godard 2005).  
One possible way of counteracting these effects would be to centralise decisions on 
allocations at the European Union level, reversing the subsidiarity principle. That is why, 
should there be a market with free allocation of fuel rights for freight transport, not only the 
principle but also the calculation method of the free allowance should be centralised. 
However, there are grounds for fearing that centralising these decisions in Brussels may not 
make them immune to intensive lobbying by industry organisations or to a degree of opacity 
in the European decision-making process.  
Lastly, another criticism, the costs of administering and declaring emissions is high for small 
emitters, i.e. structures managing only a few stationary installations affected (for example, a 
boiler in a hospital). It may legitimately be said that these failings stem essentially from the 
principle and method of free allocation currently adopted in the ETS. The above proposals on 
fuel rights are aimed at avoiding these failings.  
In the case of fuel rights for drivers, the principle of a fixed free allocation is proposed. As it 
is a fixed allocation, it avoids the need for complicated calculations that are costly to 
administer on an individualised basis. The simplicity of the allocation principle proposed and 
the transparency of the calculation as well as the fact that it applies to the entire population, 
reduces any risk of government decision-making being captured by private interest groups.  
For freight transport, it is proposed that there be no free allocation to shippers, which 
eliminates any reason to lobby for allocations and the adverse consequences that might have. 
This is in line with the developments agreed in the last EU “climate package” of December 
2008 regarding the ETS. According to this agreement, for the power sector full auctioning 
should be the rule from 2013 onwards, while for other sectors covered by the ETS a 
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transitional system should be foreseen in order to reach no free allocation in 2027. However, 
regarding road freight vehicles, in view of increasing the scheme acceptability fuel rights 
could be allocated as a fixed allowance free of charge per vehicle. In order to reduce the risks 
of escalating allocations if Member States pursue a “free rider” policy, the flat-rate allocation 
method should be regulated in detail at the European Union level. 
As a general rule, the principle of fixed, cost-free allocations, which avoid complicated 
calculations, sharply reduces the administrative costs of these schemes. There would still be 
the costs of monitoring emissions and managing fuel rights transactions, which the proposals 
above have sought to keep as low as possible.  
One last and more general problem is the volatility of the price of CO2 which has been 
observed on the European market. This volatility is compounded by uncertainty about the 
configuration the ETS will take after 2012. Price volatility runs directly counter to the need 
for a clear and continuing long-term signal on CO2 prices which can steer the required 
investment decisions in the right direction to achieve significant reductions in emissions over 
several decades. It can be addressed by the “safety valve” proposed previously. This said, 
whatever the incentive instruments used, tax or permits, a strong political willpower must 
emerge if a long-term signal is to be sent. 
4.2 Phased implementation, coordination between transport sectors 
Fuel rights would come as a mark-up on the current fuel excise taxes which are moreover 
different according to fuel categories. There is a debate on whether these taxes already 
compensate for CO2 damage and this question is not settled here. In any case current excise 
tax could be adjusted accordingly when setting up fuel rights.   
Fuel rights markets in the transport sector could be phased in. The fact that a new market is 
implemented does not mean that it will gain the support of all of the stakeholders overnight. 
Operations on rights transfer – for instance, debiting procedures at the pump – will require 
physical modifications which inevitably take time. This said, the necessary modifications 
might well happen quickly as fuel distributors will wish to attract customers who want to 
participate in the rights market. 
If stakeholders are free to enter the market, the incentive for them to do so will implicitly be 
the existence of a “CO2 tax”, provided that the latter, driven by governments, remains higher 
than the price of fuel rights on the market. The other role of the “CO2 tax” is to ensure fair 
treatment while avoiding ways out of emission reduction requirements.  
For political and practical reasons, the different fuel rights markets could be introduced 
separately, i.e. on different dates for the freight transport and private car sectors. Of course, 
for a complete coverage, public transport operators should be included in the scheme for 
passenger transportation, along with private car owners. These operators would have to return 
fuel rights in proportion of the fuel they consume to transport their passengers. However, they 
could get a free allocation, at least in the first years of the scheme, which would be granted by 
the local or regional governments as part of their transport policy and their liability of CO2 
emissions in their administrative area of competence (see the discussion on this last issue in 
section 1). 
The crucial point is that as soon as at least one of the markets is implemented a general “CO2 
tax” is established for all of the agents not yet concerned. To ensure the acceptability of these 
measures, the tax should be reasonably low to begin with, with increases to be phased in over 
19 
several years announced in advance. This will mean that the different markets will have to be 
established within a short timeframe. 
Last, the previous proposals have left open the issue of a single market for quotas trading, that 
is to say the same price of a CO2 tonne for the different sectors, whether transport or not.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Decentralised permit markets in the transport sector have a potential to be more effective in 
making this sector share the burden of reducing CO2 emissions since agents are more sensitive 
to quantitative signals than price signals in this area. Moreover, operation of the current 
European ETS and projects of trading schemes in other regions in the world indicate ways of 
international coordination and potential for inclusion of international (freight and air) 
transport in these schemes.  
Permit markets also allow the separation of issues relating to economic efficiency and equity 
of emissions reduction schemes. In terms of CO2 emissions reductions, the free allocation of 
fuel consumption rights to households is a pragmatic response to concerns about fairness. 
Moreover, given the current high levels of fuel taxes for example in Europe, this type of 
allocation would make a programme of rationing fuel by quantity rather than price more 
acceptable. 
In addition, the free allocation would provide a strong incentive to reduce fossil fuel 
consumption because of the tangible advantages to be gained by anyone who cuts their 
consumption to a level below their initial rights allocation. 
However this makes the issue of equity more obvious, especially regarding the distribution of 
free rights to households. Preliminary analyses on French data show encouraging results 
regarding the progressive character of the distribution effect but that needs to be more fully 
explored.  
Whether implementing a domestic tradable fuel rights scheme for personal travel or an 
European wide scheme for freight transport, border effects will need a thorough examination. 
It should be underlined that this is not specific to permits schemes but also applies to taxation 
schemes.   
The basic objection to the implementation of decentralised fuel rights markets in the transport 
sector is that the costs of implementation would be much too high for the desired results given 
the very large number of actors concerned. The proposals set out above, for both private 
vehicle users and freight transport are intended to reduce these costs as much as possible: they 
avoid complex calculations of allocations. The only remaining costs are the costs of 
monitoring emissions and managing fuel rights transactions: both are achieved by electronic 
procedures at least cost when purchasing “at the pump”. 
As a first guess, the administrative cost of operating fuel rights markets would be higher than 
simply extending current taxes on fuel. That may be the price to be paid for an effective 
involvement of the transport sector in the effort to reduce emissions. 
However accurate assessment of these costs still remains to be done, e.g. management and 
monitoring of quota accounts, and that is a first direction for future research. The second 
direction is to empirically evaluate the acceptability of using quotas rather than tax schemes 
and compare the cost-efficiency of both schemes. 
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